03/23/2009
More Reasons To Burn
The National Parks Advisory Council has the same problem with fuel reduction burning as every other radical green group. They claim it's not effective.
After the 2003 fires they stated in a submission to the Esplin Inquiry - a submission riddled with contradictions - that...
what also needs to be kept in perspective, and is not widely appreciated, is the capacity of
areas fuel reduced by burning to stop fires. There are good examples where areas fuel
reduced have been effective in reducing the intensity and spread of fire, enabling them to
be controlled. These, however, apply to fires burning under moderate to high fire danger,
but not generally under such extreme conditions as occurred this year. Under extreme
fire behaviour, when fires sweep through the tree crowns and spot many kilometres
ahead, previously fuel reduced areas become largely ineffective in halting the fire front,
though they may help reduce spread and damage around the flanks.
Again, this doesn't speak to the ineffectiveness of fuel reduction burning but merely points to that fact that not enough is carried out. And, quite frankly the extreme fire behaviour they refer to is a consequence of a massive fuel burden. All in all, however, at the time of this submission the Council was feeling pretty good about life. It goes on to say:
That the 2003 fires resulted in minimal loss of life and property despite their extent and severity could be
viewed as a measure of the effectiveness of current practices and of the hard work and
commitment by many community members both within and outside government agencies.
Well, that congratulatory backslapping indulgence isn't going on this year. In fact the death toll on Black Saturday is an indicator of how lucky it was that the 2003 and 2006/07 fires did not strike country towns such as Myrtleford and Bright and stayed mainly in State Forest and National Parks. That the 2003 fires resulted in minimal loss of life and property despite their extent and severity could better be described as a matter of incredible luck.
10:53 Posted in Blog | Permalink | Comments (3) | Email this
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"Under extreme fire behaviour, when fires sweep through the tree crowns and spot many kilometres ahead, previously fuel reduced areas become largely ineffective in halting the fire front, though they may help reduce spread and damage around the flanks."
That statement is counter-factual. There are numerous cases where canopy fires dropped to ground when encountering thinned and fuel-managed areas. Recent megafires in AU and the USA were eventually contained, and the containment lines were all in reduced fuel areas. Fire suppression efforts were successful where fuels were limited, and unsuccessful where they were not.
The implication of the National Parks Advisory Council's statement is that fires occur absent human intervention. That is patently absurd. Intervention is always applied to large fires--the question is where are the suppression efforts effective? The answer is where fuels have been reduced. In every case.
In his most laudable speech (now resonating around the world), Mr. Underwood roundly condemned the hands-in-the-air impotency claims made by the pro-megafire lobby. Let me add that those who ascribe to the alleged futility of stewardship are the same blokes who think people command the climate. That illogical flip-flopping is again, patently absurd.
Posted by: Mike D. | 03/23/2009
Thanks Mike. That's a point I missed completely that containment lines were all in fuel reduced areas.
So two points flow from that:
Firstly, without fuel reduction the task of suppressing megafires becomes even more difficult and secondly more fuel reduced areas create more opportunities for suppression.
Posted by: Phil Maguire | 03/23/2009
The following narrative is from the post-fire report on the Rich Fire (Plumas NF, California) of July 2008. It is long (sorry) but demonstrates an important point: THE DEBATE ABOUT FUEL MANAGEMENT IS OVER. The scientific consenus is universal. Fuel management reduces fire intensity. Period. End of story. Only a terrorist or a moron would say otherwise.
*****
The Rich Fire was a human caused fire that started at the bottom of the Feather River Canyon about 1500 on July 29, 2008. The fire was first managed by the local initial attack resources, next by the Type II Incident Management Team (IMT) working other fires in the area, and finally by a Type I IMT ordered by the Plumas National Forest.
Outside the fuel treatment area the fire intensity was moderate with high scorch heights and significant tree mortality. Inside the treatment area, the fire intensity was low with low scorch heights and low tree mortality. The fire inside this treated area burned with a low spread rate due to a lack of ladder and ground fuel which had been removed by the earlier fuel treatments. One of the Division Supervisors from the Type 1 IMT reported that the fire column was reduced significantly and the spread rates slowed down when the fire hit the ridge (fuelbreak).
This person noted that any and all direct suppression efforts became successful in the area of the fuelbreak. Before the fire hit this area, only indirect methods at the head of the fire were successful. The fuelbreak slowed the fire so much that incident resources were able to concentrate the suppression effort on higher priority areas closer to communities and deferred suppression efforts at the head of the fire and the fuelbreak.
The ridge top fuel break, where the Rich Fire entered the Kingsbury-Rush DFPZ [Defensible Fuel Profile Zone], had been commercially thinned, grapple piled, and burned in the late 1990s prior to Herger-Feinstein Quincy Library Group (HFQLG) legislation. At that time the thinning resulted in canopy closure of approximately 30%. The area was further treated as a HFQLG DFPZ with mastication, hand piling and burning completed with HFQLG funding in 2003 - 2005. The combination of treatments aided in the suppression effort and certainly allowed for the lessened tree mortality. There are continuing debates as to the appropriate canopy reduction to reduce fire behavior; however the 30% canopy cover in this study was shown to have a successful effect in decreasing the fire behavior.
The Kingsbury-Rush DFPZ was used to help contain the Rich Fire. Three hundred forty two acres of the DFPZ burned in the Rich Fire. Overall, the intensity of the fire was lower in the DFPZ and preliminary reconnaissance indicates greater tree survival in the treated versus untreated area.
Because of the fire’s proximity to communities, the fire was given a high priority for allocation of suppression resources. This aided in the positive fire suppression outcome. In addition, the ridge top location of the fuel break and gentler terrain beyond also aided in this outcome. However, a fire that was expected to burn long into the summer, costing additional money, tying up valuable fire fighting resources and damaging natural resources in an area that had already seen tremendous fire activity, quickly ran out of steam when it hit the DFPZ. Incident resources were able to suppress the fire before it could get into other valuable communities and watersheds.
Posted by: Mike D. | 03/24/2009
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